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Capital flight from Pakistan has remained one of the major concerns of policy makers, 
mainly because of the nature of private capital outflows; that is, whereas private citizens hold a 
large amount of foreign assets, the country’s burden of foreign debt continues to grow. Capital 
flight over and above normal levels raises serious concerns. Capital flight induces foreign 
donors to demand repatriation of private capital held abroad in return for their support. 
Previous studies have largely ignored the fact that illegal capital flow is a two way 
phenomenon.  Private citizens’ foreign capital is brought into the country when time is 
opportune. Using the measure of trade misinvoicing, this paper finds that between 1972 and 
2013 the (net) reverse capital flight in Pakistan was of the order of about $30 billion. To 
explain this phenomenon, the paper examines the evolution of Pakistan’s exchange and trade 
control regimes in four phases. It is found that reversed capital flight increased during liberal 
regimes when both current and capital accounts were liberalised, meaning that in the absence 
of strong regulatory bodies, private citizens could  manipulate trade and exchange laws. The 
paper offers some specific policy recommendations to restrict cross-border movement of 
capital through illegal channels. 
 
JEL Classification: F21, F32, H26 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Capital flight from Pakistan has been one of the main concerns for planners and 
policy-makers. Their worries come from the “paradoxical” nature of private capital 
outflows: private citizens hold large foreign assets while the country is in crisis burdened 
under growing foreign debt. Any abnormal capital flight when the position of foreign 
exchange reserves is unstable raises serious concerns for national welfare loss.
1
 Evidence 
on capital flight often induces foreign donors to impose conditions for repatriation of  
private capital held abroad.  
The impetus for capital flight from a country represents a demand for foreign 
exchange that arises due to portfolio reasons, excessive taxation, expectations of a major 
exchange rate realignment, macroeconomic (large fiscal and current account deficit) and 
political instability, and, of course, various foreign pull factors. Illegal outflow of capital 
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is often channelled through remittances transferred by such means as Hundi/Hawala  
system, export under-invoicing, import over-invoicing, and smuggling of precious 
metals, antiques, etc. 
Interestingly, illegal (unrecorded) capital flow is a two-way phenomenon. The 
capital held abroad by private citizens is brought into the country at opportune times. 
Policy-makers have only recently taken notice of this problem and decided to reverse 
capital flight that might be taking place through workers’ remittances. Reverse capital 
flight takes place when imports are under-invoiced and exports are over-invoiced. What 
are the reasons for reverse capital flight? The answer is three-fold. First, it helps 
whitening the black money that earlier flew from the country. Second, it facilitates 
evasion of taxes on imports, and realises superfluous rebates and refunds on exports. 
Third, it assists in the circumvention of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on imports. 
Given the nature of trade misinvoicing in Pakistan, it is permitting the two way 
movement of illegal capital. In this situation an adjustment of unrecorded private capital 
flows (arising from short-term capital movements or on payments flows that do not show  
directly in the recorded statistics) with capital flows arising from trade misinvoicing 
becomes essential to have a complete account of illegal capital flows in Pakistan.  
Previous studies [Khan (1993) and Sarmad and Mahmood (1993)] focus only on 
the problem of capital flight from Pakistan, while Mahmood and Nazli (1999), covering 
the period 1972 to 1994, find evidence of reverse capital flight to Pakistan but stop short 
of analysing the phenomenon due to changes in trade and exchange control regimes.
2
 The 
present paper shows that private citizens’ motives in evading trade taxes and 
circumventing trade controls are to build foreign assets in Pakistan. Thus, net reverse 
capital flight is indeed taking place instead of net capital flight from the country. 
Why does reverse capital flight take place? This is mainly because most of the 
reverse capital ends up in the informal part of the economy, where the owners of illegal 
capital easily avoid domestic taxes. Owners of this capital under-invoice import of goods 
with high customs duties to bring back their illegal capital. For this purpose, they use 
their foreign based capital or foreign exchange bought through Hundi/Hawala companies. 
To further hide their illegal capital from the radar of domestic tax authorities, they invest 
the capital, brought home in the guise of imported goods, in the informal sector. 
Interestingly, this happens despite the fact that owners of illegal capital can easily bring 
back the capital by remitting through the formal banking channels. This is so because by 
bringing back the illegal capital through under-invoiced imports they are  not only able to  
evade import taxes but can also keep the illegal capital hidden from authorities by 
investing it in the informal sector. 
Concomitantly, Section 111(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, provides 
immunity from probe to foreign remittances coming through formal banking channels. 
This in effect encourages money laundering and round-tripping. It works like a 
permanent amnesty scheme to bring back capital residing outside the country. Since no 
questions are asked about the source of capital and no taxes are imposed, reverse capital 
 
2It is important to note that with trade liberalisation, in the absence of effective regulatory institutions, 
opportunities to misinvoice trade increases, which accommodate two ways illegal capital flows. It may be 
noticed that the arrest of some owners of the foreign exchange companies in 2008 corroborate the view that the 
central bank’s policy on capital account liberalisation is not implemented in letters and spirit, and thus other 
means, including trade account, are being utilised to illegally transfer capital across borders. 
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inflow through remittances is mostly used in the formal economy or kept in foreign 
currency accounts. One reason for the recent surge in remittances, largely believed to be 
the reverse capital, is the adoption of stringent money laundering laws and regulations by 
the international community. 
The paper covers the period 1972 to 2013. During this period Pakistan passed 
through different exchange rate regimes including fixed exchange rate, managed floating 
exchange rate, multiple exchange rate, dirty float and flexible exchange rate. On the trade 
policy front, during this period Pakistan implemented various reform programmes, in 
particular the drastic cut in tariff rates and NTMs, and incentives for export promotion. 
Moreover, Pakistan allowed full convertibility on the current account along with partial 
convertibility on the capital account.
3
 It would be useful to analyse the illicit capital flows 
by using the latest available data, in terms of the link between capital flight and shifts in 
exchange rate and trade policy regimes.  
The rest of the paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 provides an 
overview of exchange rate and trade regimes in Pakistan. Section 3 discusses the 
methodology to identify and measure the size of trade misinvoicing. The approaches to 
estimate capital flight are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides the adjustment 
mechanism of illegal capital flows with trade misinvoicing. Section 6 reports data and 
data sources. Estimates of illicit capital flows and discussion on the findings are reported 
in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and offers some policy 
recommendations. 
 
2.  EXCHANGE RATE AND TRADE REGIMES 
To explain the trends in illicit capital flows, it would be useful to demarcate in an 
analytically meaningful manner the evolution of Pakistan’s exchange and trade control 
regimes. In this context, we delineate four phases:  
 
2.1.  Phase I (1972-1981): Fixed Exchange Rate Regime and Partial  
Lifting of Trade Controls 
During this phase, Pakistan maintained the fixed exchange rate policy. On 11th 
May 1972, the Pakistani currency was devalued by 56 percent, which was appreciated by 
11 percent in February 1973 soon after the US dollar was devalued by 10 percent. The 
exchange rate fixed in 1973 was maintained upto 7th January 1982. Upon devaluation of 
the currency, the trade control system was overhauled on the lines recommended by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The export bonus scheme that introduced a multiple 
exchange rate system throughout the 1960s was abolished, tariffs were reduced on 
intermediate and capital goods, and the degree of cascading in the tariff structure was 
lowered. With the exception of tax rebates and export financing, all export subsidies were 
withdrawn. Instead, export duties were introduced on a number of intermediate inputs to 
promote high value added industries. These were eliminated subsequently, however. In 
 
3The very fact that trade misinvoicing takes place in Pakistan, to move capital in and out of the country, 
explains that the capital account de facto is not fully convertible. Thus, those who wish to take their money out 
or bring in get indulged into trade misinvoicing activities because of certain controls that are still in place on the 
movement of capital.  
4 Zafar Mahmood 
addition to these policy measures, the import licensing system was simplified; all the 
permissible imports were placed either on the “Free List” or the “Tied List”.  During this 
phase both current and capital accounts remained substantially restricted. 
The impact of these liberalisation measures on the economy was short lived due to 
rising domestic inflation. The rupee once again became overvalued, especially after the 
appreciation of the US dollar to which the currency was pegged. Instead of devaluation of 
the rupee, the government preferred to use export subsidies and quantitative restrictions 
on imports to manage the trade balance. Licensing procedures were tightened again. 
Differential import duty rates were imposed for commercial and industrial users. All of 
these measures further increased the anti-export bias in government policies. 
 
2.2.  Phase II (1982-1998): Managed Floating Exchange Rate and 
        Liberalisation Initiatives 
The government fine-tuned the overvaluation of the currency by adopting the 
managed floating exchange rate on 8th January 1982 and linking the currency to a basket 
of 16 currencies of its major trading partners. The value of the currency started declining 
after the adoption of the new exchange rate regime. Since 1991, some new measures to 
reform the exchange and payments system were introduced that included: (i) resident 
Pakistanis were allowed to maintain foreign currency accounts like non-residents to 
attract funds held abroad by private citizens, legally or illegally; (ii) restrictions on 
holding foreign currency and on foreign exchange allowances for travel were removed; 
and (iii) rules governing private sector’s foreign borrowing were liberalised, especially 
where no government guarantee was required. In addition, a host of other restrictions on 
foreign payments were removed (e.g., for the purpose of education, royalty payment, 
foreign advertisement, and professional institutions’ membership).  
During this phase the import tariff structure was significantly rationalised: 
maximum tariff rate declined from 350 percent in 1982 to 45 percent in 1998. Import 
licensing was eliminated with the exception of a small number of items remaining on the 
negative and restricted lists; these were further reduced gradually. Non-tariff barriers 
were reduced except for security, health, religious and reciprocity reasons. Some new 
export promotion measures were also introduced such as: (i) streamlining of schemes of  
duty-drawbacks, bonded warehousing and export credit; (ii) garment units in export 
processing zones were allowed to buy textile export quotas from the Pakistani market; 
(iii) foreign companies were allowed to export goods; and (iv) improvements were made 
in the institutional arrangements for quality control, marketing and training of skilled 
manpower. 
In 1994, full convertibility of Pak-Rupee was introduced for current account 
transactions as part of the trade liberalisation programme, while a cautious approach 
was adopted for the convertibility of the capital account. The central bank 
implemented partial convertibility of the capital account by allowing foreign 
exchange companies to operate in Pakistan and the corporate sector to obtain foreign 
equity. Pak-Rupee was also made fully convertible for some capital account 
transactions, e.g., foreign portfolio investment in the country. Aside from allowing 
100 percent foreign equity participation, no restrictions were in place on the 
repatriation of capital, profits, royalty, etc.  
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2.3.  Phase III (July 1998-July 2000): Multiple Exchange Rate and  
Dirty Float Regimes 
This phase was marked with political instability in the country and economic 
sanctions by western countries against the nuclear test by Pakistan. The government 
froze the foreign currency accounts in order to preserve its official foreign exchange 
reserves. These steps eroded the confidence of the private sector. Whatever gains had 
been made  on the current and capital accounts through liberalisation in the earlier 
periods were virtually reversed. To counter the crisis, government adopted the system 
of multiple exchange rates consisting of an official rate (pegged to US dollar), a 
floating inter-bank rate (FIBR), and a composite rate (combining official and FIBR 
rates). On May 1999, Pakistan adopted the system of dirty floating exchange rate and 
the currency was pegged to the US dollar by removing the multiple exchange rate 
system. The exchange rate was then defended within narrow bands (margins) till July 
2000.  
Despite economic and political difficulties, Pakistan resisted the protectionist 
pressure from domestic interest groups and continued with market-based reforms, 
including a more liberal policy for imports and foreign investment. Besides, the 
maximum tariff rate came down to 30 percent from 45 percent in 1998. The scope of 
export prohibitions was reduced and export subsidies were linked with export-
performance.  
 
2.4.  Phase IV (July 2000-2013): Flexible Exchange Rate Regime and  
        Trade Liberalisation 
Since 20th July 2000, Pakistan has been following a flexible exchange rate regime. 
Nevertheless, the de jure exchange rate arrangement is managed float without fixing pre-
determined paths for the exchange rate. The central bank’s interventions are limited to 
moderating and preventing excessive fluctuations in the exchange rate. The central bank 
intervenes in the market using the US dollar. Foreign exchange controls and restrictions 
are now minimal. Current account transactions are now unrestricted except for 
occasionally imposed limits on advance payments for some imports. Foreign investors 
can now freely bring in and take out their capital, profits, dividends, royalties, etc. IMF 
(2010) classifies Pakistan’s exchange rate regime as a de facto conventional peg to the 
US dollar within a narrow band. 
Pakistan has reduced tariff rates across the board. Between 2003 and 2007, the 
maximum tariff rate was 25 percent. However, due to rising trade deficit, the maximum 
tariff was raised to 35 percent in 2008. In the 2012-2013 budget, the government reduced 
maximum tariff rate to 30 percent and simplified the tariff structure by reducing the 
number of tariff slabs from 8 to 7. Quantitative restrictions and other direct state 
interventions relating to trade have been drastically reduced. Ordinary customs duties are 
now the primary trade policy instrument along with some NTMs that range from price 
controls to exchange and finance controls, quantity controls, and monopolistic and 
technical measures. Many of the statutory regulatory orders (SROs) providing 
discretionary exemptions to firms and industries are still in force making the trade regime 
more complicated. 
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The government has introduced the Strategic Trade Policy Framework (2009-
2012). It includes measures such as: financing of export firms at fixed interests for a short 
to medium term, creation of a fund to hedge markup rate hikes, provision of insurance 
cover for visiting buyers, facilitation of export firms in foreign markets, arranging 
warehousing facilities abroad, providing support for compliance certification, 
compensating inland freight charges, funding technology, skills and management 
upgradation for value added products, supporting brand promotion and  compliance with 
safety standards, clustering development, reducing cost of doing business, etc.  
 
3.  TRADE MISINVOICING 
An importer is tempted to under-invoice imports if import duties and rents on 
quantitatively restricted imports are higher than the premium on the exchange rate in the 
open (or black) market that he has to purchase to pay foreign sellers in full. When there 
are no foreign exchange controls but trade barriers do exist, then clearly there is an 
incentive to under-invoice imports [Mahmood (1997)]. There is, however, some risk 
attached both to under-invoicing of imports and engaging in illegal foreign exchange 
transactions. Thus, under-invoicing will not occur unless the difference between import 
tariff equivalent and premium on foreign exchange in the open market is greater than the 
evaluated risk factor of being caught by law enforcing agencies [Bhagwati (1964)]. The 
importer who practices under invoicing brings capital to the country (the reverse capital 
flight) and draws benefit from this transaction. It is quite likely that if this perceived 
benefit is added to the saving of import duties due to import under-invoicing then the 
above differential further rises. Capital is brought into the country but  by by-passing 
official foreign exchange reserves.  
One can also explain over-invoicing of imports that takes place simultaneously. 
This is used to take capital out of the country. In this case, the importer is willing to pay 
higher customs duties to take out its capital, normally the ‘black money’, outside the 
country to safe havens, to whiten it at a later date. With the resultant higher average 
import tax earning rate it transmits false signals about the trade policy being more 
protectionist or restrictive whereas in fact it is not. 
Likewise, under-invoicing of exports is practised to take black money outside the 
country. By under-invoicing, the exporter is willing to surrender the benefit of export 
subsidy if it is available or avoid export tax if there is any. This practice deprives the 
government of foreign exchange earnings. 
Some exporters also resort to export over-invoicing to illegitimately benefit from 
export subsidies and to make reverse capital flight possible to whiten the black money 
taken out of the country at some earlier date. If the exporters do not have black money 
outside the country then they buy it from the Hundi/Hawala (“correspondent”) exchange 
companies based in foreign countries. In this case exporters compare the differential 
between the subsidy rate and the perceived benefit from reverse capital with the premium 
on foreign exchange paid on capital purchased from the Hundi/Hawala traders in the 
open market; if the differential is greater than the evaluated risk factor of being caught, 
then the exporter will over-invoice. In this case government receives additional foreign 
exchange earnings but loses on account of extra export subsidies it pays for over-invoiced 
exports. 
 Reverse Capital Flight to Pakistan  7 
 
 
4.  ILLICIT CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
Two approaches to measure illicit capital movements are available in the literature: 
direct and indirect. The direct approach uses information obtained from the balance of 
payments accounts. This approach identifies capital flight as short-term capital outflows, 
and considers it as a response of private citizens to investment risks in the country. 
Usually, these funds promptly respond to political or financial crisis and expectations 
about more restrictions on capital account or devaluation of the home currency. 
Cuddington (1986) using the direct approach, defines capital flight as a short-term 
(speculative) reaction of private investors to macroeconomic instabilities or other policy-
induced investment risks.
4
 This is why the Cuddington approach focuses only on the 
acquisition of short-term foreign assets by private non-bank investors, and errors and 
omissions instead of the private sector’s total acquisition of external claims.5 Cuddington 
chooses only the short-term foreign assets because they presumably respond quickly to 
changes in expected profitability or shift in risks. Cuddington thus defines capital flight 
(KFCUD) as: 
KFCUD = –NEO – NAC … … … … … … (1) 
where, NEO stands for net errors and omissions; and 
           NAC for net acquisition of non-bank private short-term capital. 
The direct measure of capital flight is not free from criticism as it does not take   
other than short-term capital flows into account  because long-term foreign financial 
assets are close substitutes for short-term assets due to the existence of very active 
secondary markets in long-term financial assets. On the other hand, errors and omissions 
include unrecorded flows or statistical discrepancies. In view of this criticism, indirect 
approaches to capital flight are also suggested.  
Indirect approaches include the World Bank’s (1985) and that of Morgan (1986). 
In these approaches, capital flight is considered as a residual of increase in external debt, 
net foreign direct investment, foreign exchange reserves and the current account deficit. 
Here, the idea is that the first two inflows finance the latter two outflows. If the first two 
sources of funds cannot finance the latter two uses of funds then the difference would 
indicate occurence of capital flight.  
The World Bank approach considers increases in external debt and net foreign 
direct investment as capital inflows to the country, and deducts from these inflows the 
sum of current account deficit and increase in official reserves. This difference is taken as 
a claim on foreign assets by private individuals. In other words, this approach assumes 
that if the capital inflows do not finance the current account deficit or official reserve 
accumulation (i.e., the recorded use of foreign funds), it leaves the country in the form of 
capital flight. The World Bank definition of capital flight (KFWB) can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
4Also see, Eggerstedt, Hall, and Wijnbergen (1993). 
5It may be noted that ‘errors and omissions’ usually consist of both unrecorded short-term and long-
term capital; therefore, estimates based on Cuddington’s definition are not purely short-term. Moreover, capital 
flight cannot be restricted to short-term assets only, because the long-term foreign bonds are now considered as 
close substitute to short-term assets as there is very little loss of liquidity associated with acquisition of long-
term assets in the secondary capital market.  
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                      … … … … (2) 
where, 
CAB  is  Current account balance, 
COR  is  Changes in official reserves, 
CED is  Changes in external debt, and 
NFDI is Net foreign direct investment. 
The Morgan definition
6
 works out foreign capital inflows on the lines of  the 
World Bank definition. In this approach inflows are used to finance the current account 
deficit, increase in official reserves and increase in the net foreign assets held by 
commercial banks. Thus, the Morgan definition of capital flight (KFMOR) can be written 
as: 
                            … … … (3) 
where, NAFA is Net acquisition of foreign assets by commercial banks. 
 
5.  ADJUSTMENT OF CAPITAL FLIGHT WITH  
TRADE MISINVOICING 
Trade and foreign exchange restrictions and lax enforcement of controls create 
incentives for trade misinvoicing in such a way that it can result in both way movement 
of private capital, i.e., capital flight from the country and/or reverse capital flight to the 
country. Interestingly, the difference in trade statistics of the reporting country and its 
trading partners often helps to identify this problem. Using the partner country data 
technique,
7
 we adjust the capital flight estimates derived from three approaches with 
estimates of trade misinvoicing in the following way: 
               
                 
                 
where,  
 KFMWB  is Capital flight estimates adjusted for trade misinvoicing using 
the World Bank approach. 
 KFMMOR  is Capital flight estimates adjusted for trade misinvoicing using 
the Morgan approach. 
 KFMCUD  is Capital flight estimates adjusted for trade misinvoicing using 
the Cuddington approach. 
 MI = MIx + MIm  = Misinvoicing in total trade. 
 MIx = Micp – Xpic * Ad  = Misinvoicing of exports. 
If MIx < 0 then exports over-invoicing is taking place from the country. 
 
6The definitions of capital flight by the World Bank and Morgan consider total accumulation of foreign 
assets short-term and long-term (both reported and unreported). 
7In this technique, cif import values of the country are compared with cif-fob adjusted export values of 
the partner country to find ‘perverse’ discrepancies in trade statistics [see, Bhagwati (1964); Bhagwati, Krueger, 
and Wibukswasdi (1974); Gulati (1987); Mahmood and Mahmood (1993); Mahmood (1997) and Mahmood and 
Azhar (2001)].  
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If MIx > 0 then exports under-invoicing is taking place from the country. 
 MIm = Mpic – Xicp * Ad  = Misinvoicing of imports. 
If MIm > 0 then imports over-invoicing is taking place in the country. 
If MIm < 0 then imports under-invoicing is taking place in the country. 
 Micp  = Imports of industrial countries from Pakistan (cif). 
 Xpic  = Exports of Pakistan to industrial countries (fob). 
 Mpic  = Imports of Pakistan from industrial countries (cif). 
 Xicp  = Exports of industrial countries to Pakistan (fob). 
 Ad  = Adjustment factor defined as cif–fob ratio. 
 
6.  DATA 
We adopt here the sign convention used in the balance of payments accounts. The 
data used here are for the period 1972-2009. The data definitions and sources used are as 
following: 
(1) Changes in external debt. World Bank: World Debt Tables. 
(2) Net foreign direct investment. IMF: Balance of Payments. Line 3..XA. 
(3) Current account surplus. IMF: Balance of Payments. Line A..C4. 
(4) Changes in official reserves. IMF: Balance of Payments. Line 2..X4. 
(5) Errors and omissions. IMF: Balance of Payments. Line A..X4. 
(6) Non-bank private short-term capital. IMF: Balance of Payments. Line 8..2X4. 
(7) Net acquisition of foreign assets by banks. Figures are multiplied by -1 for 
consistency with the balance of payments sign convention. IMF: International 
Financial Statistics. Line 7ad. 
(8) Trade data for Pakistan and industrial countries IMF: Direction of Trade. 
(9) cif-fob factor. IMF: International Financial Statistics. 
(10) Before 1982, values in items 1-6 were reported in terms of Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs). These values are converted into US dollars by using the average 
SDR/dollar exchange rate reported in IMF: International Financial Statistics, 
Line sb. 
 
7.   ESTIMATES OF CAPITAL FLIGHT 
How large is the size of illicit capital flows in Pakistan? Between 1972 and 2013, 
Pakistan received (net) illicit capital inflow (or reverse capital flight) of about $30 
billion.
8
 Accumulated reverse capital flight represents 50.5 percent of the total 
outstanding external debt and 13 percent of the GDP in 2013. Such a large size of reverse 
capital flight negates the widespread and exaggerated impression about the net capital 
flight from the country. 
In illicit capital flow activities individuals with varied behaviours and interests are 
involved. Their motive essentially is to circumvent economic policies to draw maximum 
benefit for themselves. As economic policies change from time to time to meet 
 
8It needs to be underlined here that since workers’ remittances through official channels are also partly 
used to reverse the capital flight, the above figure is, somewhat, an understatement of the true size of the reverse 
capital flight. In the FY2005-06 Pakistan received $4.6 billion, which rose to $13.92 billion in FY2012-13—a 
3-times rise in remittances. 
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developmental objectives of the economy, so does illicit capital movement in intensity 
and direction. The preceding analysis shows that illicit capital flow is an area which 
successive governments in Pakistan have not been able to contain. 
Table 1 shows that on average in all periods, the Pakistani traders over-invoiced 
exports and under-invoiced imports to bring illicit capital to the country. More 
specifically, Table 1 reveals that in the first phase (1972-1981) exports were under-
invoiced by an average of $28.43 million per annum. It shows the clear motive to take 
capital out of the country. This is the period when capital account restrictions were the 
harshest. Exports of intermediate inputs were restricted by using export duties. Thus, 
exporters not only circumvented capital controls but also export restrictions with 
connivance of the Customs staff. In the same phase, however, imports were under-
invoiced by $277.48 million per annum. In this case, the clear motive was to bring illicit 
capital back to the country and evade high import duties. On the net basis, during the first 
phase there was a reverse capital flight of $249.10 million per annum through trade 
misinvoicing.  
In all the remaining three phases, Table 1 shows that there was over-invoicing of 
exports and under-invoicing of imports. Consequently, in the period when managed 
floating exchange rate or flexible exchange rate policies were in force, the country 
received a net inflow of illicit capital through the balance of payments account. The 
highest average per annum export over-invoicing was recorded during the third phase 
(1998–2000). This period was marked with depletion of foreign exchange reserves, 
economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries, freezing of foreign currency 
accounts, use of multiple exchange rates and later, adoption of the dirty floating exchange 
rate, and use of export-performance linked export subsidies. At the time when 
government was looking for financial resources, exporters deprived the country by 
obtaining extra subsidy on account of over-invoiced exports. Nonetheless, government 






Trade Misinvoicing (Average Per Annum, US Dollar in Million) 
Period/Phase Exports Imports Total Trade 
I: 1972-1981 28.43 –277.48 –249.10 
II: 1982-1998 –161.52 –769.62 –931.14 
III: 1998-2000 –443.35 –160.10 –603.46 
IV: 2000-2013 –166.38 –557.97 –724.35 
Total Period –138.48 –548.66 –687.14 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
The highest under-invoicing of imports was recorded during the second phase 
(1982-1998), when by and large tariffs and NTBs were very high, so there was an 
incentive for importers to circumvent trade policy restrictions and indulge in import 
under-invoicing activities and bringing home illicit capital (Table 1). The fourth phase 
 
9It may be noted that in the absence of export over-invoicing, remittances that were to be used to over-
invoice exports may come through legal channels thus raising the official foreign exchange reserves. 
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(2000-2013) also recorded very high levels of average per annum import under-invoicing. 
During this period, tariff rates were not very high but still high enough to entice importers 
to resort to such activities. Although, NTBs declined during this period but NTMs 
increased owing to corruption and bad governance. On the net basis, the overall illicit 
capital inflow was the highest during the second phase followed by the fourth phase. 
Total trade misinvoicing estimates show that relatively lower trade restrictions and 
liberalisation of current and capital accounts, especially in the fourth phase, could not 
stop illicit capital movement. This implies that implicit trade and capital accounts 
restrictions remained widespread, which enticed people to defy them to draw benefits. 
The pertinent question is how this large illicit capital inflow was financed. The answer is 
through Hundi/Hawala, a channel that is used to finance trade misinvoicing. In addition, 
illicit capital that was taken out of the country at some earlier date became a major source 
of reverse capital flight at a later date. 
Table 2 reports estimates of capital flight that are un-adjusted for trade 
misinvoicing using the three approaches discussed earlier: the World Bank, Morgan and 
Cuddington’s. Estimates using these approaches are not very consistent with each other; 
thus, it is difficult to arrive at any consensual conclusion. Whereas the Morgan and 
Cuddington estimates are consistent with each other in the first three phases, they are 
inconsistent with each other in the fourth phase.  
The World Bank estimates show that there was a net capital flight from Pakistan in 
the first three phases, while both Morgan and Cuddington approaches show net inflow of 
illicit capital (Table 2). In the fourth phase, estimates based on the World Bank and 
Cuddington approaches show reverse capital flight while the Morgan approach shows a 
net capital flight from the country; this is mainly because of large acquisition of foreign 
assets by commercial banks, a component this approach includes in addition to the 
components of the World Bank approach (see Equations 2 and 3). Arguably, acquisition 
of foreign assets by commercial banks is not capital flight, so the Morgan estimates 
should be used with some care. On the whole, for all periods unadjusted estimates for the 
World Bank and Morgan definitions show net capital flight from Pakistan, while the 
Cuddington approach shows reverse capital flight. 
 
Table 2 
Un-adjusted Capital Flight (Average Per Annum, US Dollar in Million) 
Period/Phase World Bank Morgan Cuddington 
I: 1972-1981 16.9 –6.3 –29.00 
II: 1982-1998 39.71 –357.71 –121.53 
III: 1998-2000 89 –227.67 –461.33 
IV: 2000-2013 –57.46 2216.00 –43.46 
Total Period 8.47 511.47 –100.12 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
Although, we could not arrive at some consensus using estimates of capital flight 
that are un-adjusted for trade misinvoicing, yet the adjusted estimates of capital flight are 
congruous in all approaches in all phases except for Morgan in the fourth phase (Table 3). 
The World Bank approach shows that with the change in exchange rate regime and trade 
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liberalisation, the size of reverse capital flight has increased. A similar result can be 
noticed for the Cuddington approach. This pattern has emerged due to a fall in cost of 
illicit capital flow transactions owing to both trade and capital accounts’ liberalisation, 
especially as the regulatory bodies are weak in implementing the rules and regulations. 
All in all, Table 3 reveals that Pakistani private citizens have been bringing huge amounts 
of illicit capital every year since 1972.   
 
Table 3 
Adjusted Capital Flight (Average Per Annum, US Dollars in Million) 
Period/Phase World Bank Morgan Cuddington 
I: 1972-1981 –232.15 –255.35 –278.05 
II: 1982-1998 –891.44 –1288.85 –1052.67 
III: 1998-2000 –514.45 –831.12 –1064.79 
IV: 2000-2013 –781.81 1492.57 –767.81 
Total Period –678.67 –175.67 –787.25 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
So far we have discussed the trends in illicit capital movement across borders. We 
can gain more insights if we use the estimates to find out the importance of illicit capital 
flows in terms of GDP and foreign exchange earnings. The ratio of reverse capital flight 
to GDP
10
, for example, can be considered as the investment going into the underground 
economy. The ratio of reverse capital flight to foreign exchange earnings indicates the 
significance of illicit capital inflow vis á vis official capital inflows.  
Using the World Bank approach, the estimates of reverse capital flight to GDP 
show the highest ratio in the second phase (1982-1998), followed by the third phase, the 
first phase and the fourth phase (Table 4). What these estimates signify? On average, they 
are about 1.5 percent of the annual GDP. If we recap the happenings in the second phase, 
it may be noticed that during this period Pakistan launched a programme of economic 
liberalisation, privatisation and denationalisation, the structural adjustment programme  
with donors’ support, a shift in the exchange rate regime from fixed to a managed float, 
policy of whitening of domestic black capital and the illegal capital residing abroad and 
permission for opening of foreign currency accounts to residents. With these major policy 
changes, when the cost of transaction of capital flows declined, it became easy for private 
citizens to bring back their capital held abroad. To avoid any legal actions at a later date 
by the government, most of this capital was brought into the country through illegal 
channels instead of legal channels. 
The ratio of reverse capital flight to foreign exchange earnings was the highest in 
the third phase (Table 4). This was the time period when the country followed multiple 
exchange rate policy, freezing of foreign currency accounts as a result of decline in 
foreign exchange earnings including remittances and export earnings. Consequently, in 
this period of uncertainty private citizens proportionately brought home more capital 
through illegal channels.  
 
10Different studies estimate that the size of the underground economy in Pakistan is about the same as 
that of the formal economy. See for instance, Kemal and Qasim (2012). 




Significance of Adjusted Illicit Capital Flows for Pakistan (Annual Average; Percent) 
 
Capital Flight as a  
Percentage of GDP 
Capital Flight as a Percentage of Foreign 
Exchange Earnings 
Period/Phase World Bank Morgan Cuddington World Bank Morgan Cuddington 
I: 1972-1981 –1.259 –1.460 –1.721 –8.415 –10.410 –14.950 
II: 1982-1998 –1.932 –2.650 –2.395 –9.531 –13.115 –11.969 
III: 1998-2000 –1.856 –1.540 –1.513 –1.0561 –9.254 –8.785 
IV: 2000-2013 –0.499 1.063 –0.821 –2.512 4.756 –4.234 
Total Period –1.357 –1.277 –1.722 –7.369 –7.089 –10.241 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
8.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this paper refute the general assertion that providing external funds 
to countries like Pakistan could be futile if they lead to capital flight. Contrary to this 
claim, this paper shows that reverse capital flight takes place on net basis all the time. 
These illicit inflows complement the resources received by the country in the form of 
foreign loans, foreign investment and the country’s own foreign exchange earnings. Of 
course, illicit capital is largely invested in the underground part of the economy. The 
underground part of the economy, including the real estate sector, is out of the tax net. 
Industries in Pakistan prefer to under-report their true installed capacity by under-
invoicing their plant and machinery and hence under-report the actual size of the 
establishment. This practice ultimately helps industries to also evade taxes on their sales, 
purchase of domestic inputs and income.  
Capital flight exacerbates problems in the domestic economy including 
unfavourable investment climate. By implication, a healthy state and conducive economic 
environment should be instituted in the event of reverse capital flight. The paper finds 
evidence of large volume of reverse capital flight to Pakistan. Does this mean that 
everything on the economic front is very well in the country? Perhaps not! As noted 
earlier, the way business in commercial markets and real estate sector is flourishing and 
expanding, one is tempted to conclude that the situation is favourable for absorbing 
reverse capital flight.  
An important finding is that the reverse capital flight increased during the period 
of trade and exchange liberalisation. This indicates that in the absence of strong 
regulatory bodies, liberalised trade and exchange regimes allowed private citizens to 
manipulate trade and exchange laws. 
Tax evasion and avoidance have been the key sources of illicit movement of 
capital across borders in Pakistan. Improving tax administration and effective 
enforcement of trade laws can control to and fro movements of illicit capital. The 
following specific measures are suggested to restrict the cross-border movement of 
capital through illegal channels: 
(1) Money obtained through corruption and tax avoidance/evasion is the main 
source of illicit funds that are illegally transferred across borders. There is 
therefore a dire need to introduce governance reforms to control rampant 
corruption in the country, which undercuts lawful activities in the country.  
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(2) Illicit capital movements are largely due to lax enforcement of capital and trade 
controls by regulatory bodies. This provides high premium to private citizens if 
they circumvent trade and foreign exchange controls and misuse trade 
incentives. An effective implementation of trade and exchange controls is, 
therefore, expected to discourage illicit movement of capital. In this context, it 
would be very rewarding if customs administration is improved, tariff structure 
is simplified by making it more uniform, and appointing pre-shipment 
inspection companies with good reputation. 
(3) To control Hundi/Hawala (correspondent) businesses, their related individuals 
or entities be traced by banking authorities who are holding large sums of 
funds to settle laundered money in Pakistan. Government’s Remittance 
Initiative has made a little dent in this system but this menace is still going on 
at a large scale.  
(4) A policy support that discourages undervaluation of capital in the country would 
make under-invoicing of imports of plants and machinery less attractive. For 
example, a policy of accelerated depreciation allowance to attract investment might 
offset under-invoicing of imports of capital goods and other goods. 
(5) For domestic capital that is residing illegally abroad, arrangements may be 
made with other countries about prompt sharing of information concerning 
private citizens’ bank accounts and trade-related transactions to and from 
Pakistan. Moreover, the international community must be reminded of its 
responsibilities of not allowing its jurisdiction for movement of illicit capital to 
and from Pakistan by using international forums. 
(6) As most of the reverse capital flight ends up in the informal part of the 
economy, there is an urgent need to bring this part of the economy under the 
tax net to resolve the problem of illicit capital movement. But this raises a 
pertinent question; is Pakistan’s taxation system so unfair and punitive that 
capital owners prefer to invest in the informal sector? To be fair with the tax 
authorities, it seems that it is not a question of paying some tax, but no tax at 
all! Thus, a culture of tax compliance needs to be created, but this calls for an 
active role of the decision-makers.  
(7) Use of trade misinvoicing (i.e., the trade account) to move capital in and out of 
the country indicates that the capital account in the de facto realm is not fully 
convertible although in the de jure area the system seems to be fully 
convertible. This dichotomy needs to be eliminated by taking appropriate and 
effective measures. 
(8) Last but not least, sound macroeconomic environment and policies in the 
country should be able to prevent cross-border movement of illicit capital. 
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